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This paper explores how the costs of meeting given aggregate targets for pollu-
tion emissions change with the imposition of the requirement that key pollution-related
industries be compensated for potential losses of proﬁt from the pollution regulation.
Using analytically and numerically solved equilibrium models, we compare the incidence
and costs of emissions taxes, fuel (intermediate input) taxes, performance standards and
mandated technologies in the absence and presence of this compensation requirement.
Compensation is provided either through industry tax credits or industry-speciﬁcc u t s
in capital tax rates.
We decompose the added costs from the compensation requirement into (1) an in-
crease in “intrinsic abatement cost,” reﬂecting a lowered eﬃciency of pollution abate-
ment, and (2) a “lump-sum compensation cost” that captures the eﬃciency costs of
ﬁnancing the compensation. The compensation requirement aﬀects these components
diﬀerently, depending on the policy instrument involved and the required extent of pollu-
tion abatement. As a result, it can change the cost-rankings of the diﬀerent instruments.
In particular, when compensation is provided through tax credits, the lump-sum
compensation cost is higher under the emissions tax than under the command-and-
control policies (performance standards and mandated technologies) — a reﬂection of the
higher compensation requirements under the emissions tax. When the required pollution
reduction is modest, imposing the compensation requirement causes the emissions tax to
lose its status as the least costly instrument and to become more costly than command
and control policies. In contrast, when required abatement is extensive, the emissions
tax again becomes the most-cost eﬀective instrument because of its advantages in terms
of lower intrinsic abatement cost.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A critical environmental policy decision is the choice of policy instrument to achieve
given aggregate targets for pollution emissions or concentrations. The policy maker’s
toolkit includes emissions taxes, fuel taxes, performance standards, tradable emissions
allowances, and mandated production technologies.
In ranking these alternatives, economists tend to compare the instruments in terms
of their cost-eﬀectiveness.1 However, policy makers often are at least as much concerned
with how these options may diﬀer in terms of the distribution of policy costs, since such
diﬀerences importantly aﬀect political feasibility.
Distributional impacts can be measured along several diﬀerent dimensions — across
household income groups, generations, geographic regions, and industries. The distribu-
tion across industries can be especially important, since industry groups often constitute
a powerful political force. To the extent that industrial stakeholders wield signiﬁcant
political power, designing policies that achieve environmental goals while avoiding seri-
ous adverse impacts on key industries can enhance political feasibility.
In this paper we examine how the costs of meeting given targets for pollution emis-
sions change once one adds the requirement that the regulations cause no loss in proﬁt
in key pollution-related industries. In our investigation, this requirement is met by in-
cluding, as part of the environmental policy, either tax credits or reductions in capital
tax rates to certain aﬀected industries.
Our analysis is in the spirit of a paper by Bovenberg, Goulder, and Gurney (2005),
which examined how introducing a constraint on proﬁt-losses aﬀects the costs of emis-
sions taxes and quotas. The present paper goes beyond the previous paper by con-
sidering a wider range of policy instruments, focusing not only on emissions taxes and
quotas2 but also on taxes on fuels (intermediate inputs associated with pollution) and
two “command-and-control” policies — performance standards and mandated production
technologies.
We apply both analytical and numerical equilibrium models in this investigation.
Compared with the Bovenberg et al. paper, the present investigation requires consid-
1See, for example, Tietenberg (1990), Stavins (1996), Goulder et al. (1999) and Fischer et al. (2003).
2In this analysis a system of tradable emissions quotas is equivalent to an emissions tax with a tax
exemption for some emissions.
1erably more complex analytical modeling in order to capture the impacts of this wider
range of instruments. The analytical and numerical models both show that the over-
all gross cost3 of achieving a given reduction in emissions can be understood in terms
of two components: an intrinsic abatement cost and a lump-sum compensation cost.
The former cost depends on the eﬃciency with which the policy instrument in ques-
tion makes use of the three major channels for emissions reductions: input substitution,
end-of-pipe treatment, and output reduction. The second cost reﬂects ineﬃciencies
associated with providing the compensation to meet the no-proﬁt-loss constraint, when
this compensation takes the form of lump-sum payments such as corporate tax credits.4
As in earlier studies, we ﬁnd that in the absence of a proﬁts constraint, emissions
taxes are less costly than fuel taxes and the command-and-control policies because they
most eﬀectively employ the three major channels for emissions reductions. However,
introducing the distributional constraint can reverse the overall cost rankings. In par-
ticular, when compensation takes the form of tax credits and the required amount of
abatement is small or moderate, the command-and-control policies emerge as less costly
than emissions taxes. The analytical and numerical models show that at low levels of
abatement, emissions taxes (and fuel taxes) have a signiﬁcant disadvantage in terms of
the costs of compensation — the lump-sum compensation cost is signiﬁcant. The higher
compensation cost more than oﬀsets the emissions tax’s advantage in terms of the intrin-
sic abatement cost. In contrast, when environmental policy is more stringent (that is,
requires greater abatement), the emissions tax’s advantage by virtue of its lower intrinsic
abatement cost becomes more important than its disadvantage in terms of the compen-
sation cost. Thus, the relative costs of emissions taxes and the command-and-control
instruments depend importantly on the extent of required abatement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the analytical
model and derives and interprets its results. The analytical results stem from linear ap-
proximations; hence they are not necessarily valid for large policy changes. In addition,
the analytical model assumes that the regulated pollution-supplying industries are very
small relative to the economy as a whole. The linearity and small-industry assumptions
are relaxed in the numerical model of Section 3, which provides quantitative results.
3By “gross cost” we mean the cost before netting out the beneﬁts from policy-induced environmental
improvements.
4As shown below, when compensation takes the form of reductions in marginal corporate tax rates,
the compensation is costly because it implies less eﬀective use of the three abatement channels. In formal
terms, this compensation-related cost is in fact an increase in the intrinsic abatement cost relative to
what that cost would be in the absence of a compensation requirement.
2Section 4 oﬀers conclusions.
2A n A n a l y t i c a l M o d e l
Here we describe an analytically tractable equilibrium model designed to capture the
eﬃciency and distributional eﬀects of a range of environmental policy instruments. The
model can assess how the eﬃciency impacts change when the policies include compen-
sation to aﬀected industries. In the model, pollution cuts can be accomplished through
both input-substitution and “end-of-pipe” emissions treatment. The model recognizes
the imperfect mobility of capital, which is critical for evaluating the proﬁt impacts of
various policies.
There are two primary factors of production, capital (K) and labor (L). Capital
is treated as imperfectly mobile across industries, labor as perfectly mobile. The model
distinguishes three industries: an upstream industry that produces an intermediate
good X whose use is associated with pollution, a downstream industry that produces
a ﬁnal good Y and generates pollution emissions, and another ﬁnal good industry that
produces a clean, ﬁnal good C without generating any pollution. Industry Y ’s emissions
depend on the extent to which it employs the intermediate input X. Industry Y can
reduce these emissions by changing its input mix (substituting labor or capital for X)
and by engaging in end-of-pipe treatment. One can think of the intermediate input, X,
as a fossil fuel and regard the downstream industry, Y , as an industry like electricity
that burns the fuel and produces pollution.
2.1 Model structure
2.1.1 Production
The upstream industry produces the intermediate good X according to the following
constant-returns-to-scale production function
X = fx(Lx,K x), (1)
where Lx denotes employment in the upstream industry and Kx stands for the capital
stock in that industry. Competitive maximizing behavior yields
Px
∂fx(.;.)
∂Lx
= W, (2)
3Px
∂fx(.;.)
∂Kx
= Rx − Skx, (3)
where Px denotes the price of the intermediate good, W the wage rate, Rx the rental
rate of capital in the upstream sector, and Skx a sector-speciﬁc capital subsidy in that
sector. Since capital is imperfectly mobile, the rental rate can diﬀer across industries.
The wage rate, in contrast, is the same in both industries, in keeping with the assumption
of perfectly mobile labor.
The constant-returns-to-scale production function of the downstream industry Y is
given by
Y = fy(Ky,X,L y)=h(v(Ky;X);Ly), (4)
where Ly stands for employment engaged in production in the downstream industry and
Ky is the capital stock in that industry. Industry Y i st h eo n l ys o u r c eo fd e m a n df o r
the intermediate input X. The production function is weakly separable.5 In particular,
the marginal rate of substitution between the intermediate input X and capital Ky does
not depend on industry-speciﬁce m p l o y m e n tLy; the intermediate input and capital ﬁrst
yield the composite v(Ky;X), which in turn is combined with labor to yield output Y.
The use of the intermediate input by the downstream industry causes pollution.
This pollution can be reduced, however, by devoting resources to end-of-pipe treatment.
Pollution emissions, E, are given by
E = n(X,g(Ca;Ya)), (5)
with ∂n/∂X ≥ 0; ∂n/∂g ≤ 0; ∂g/∂Ca ≥ 0;∂g/∂Ya ≥ 0. The subfunction g(.,.) is
a composite of the two ﬁnal goods Ya and Ca; it is an index of resources devoted to
end-of-pipe treatment.6
Pure proﬁts in the downstream industry are given by (Py + S)Y − (Px + Tx)X −
TeE − WLy − PcCa − PyYa − (Ry − Sky)Ky, where Py represents the price of the ﬁnal
good produced by the downstream industry Y , S a subsidy on that good, Tx an input
tax on the good produced by the upstream industry, Pc t h ep r i c eo ft h eo t h e r ,c l e a nﬁnal
good C, Ry the rental rate of capital in the downstream industry, Sky a sector-speciﬁc
subsidy to capital in that sector, and Te, the tax on emissions. As indicated below, the
various environmental policies we explore below involve a combination of the taxes Tx
5These separability assumptions are consistent with empirical work (see, e.g., Jorgenson and Wilcoxen
(1993a, b) suggesting that capital is a complement to energy (or fuel) inputs.
6The functions n(.,. ) and g(.,.) exhibit constant returns to scale in their arguments. The function
g(.,.) aggregates the goods C and Y also in the utility function (see (7) below).
4and Te and the subsidies S, Sky and Skx.
The industry producing the clean ﬁnal good C employs the constant-returns-to-scale
production function
C = fc(Lc,K c),
where Lc and Kc stand for labor and capital employed in that industry. All industries
maximize proﬁts, taking prices as given. Since the production and emission functions
exhibit constant returns to scale, proﬁts are zero in equilibrium.
2.1.2 Imperfect capital mobility
An important feature of the model is the imperfect mobility of capital across sectors.
This implies that the proﬁt impacts of an unanticipated policy shock will not be uni-
formly spread across capital owners in all industries, because capital cannot costlessly
move toward the sectors with the highest returns after the shocks. To capture capital’s
imperfect mobility, we employ the following transformation function:7
k(Kx;Ky;Kc)=K, (6)
where K represents the economy-wide stock of capital. We assume that the substitution
elasticities between the three types of capital are less than inﬁnite. Thus, when a unit of
capital is shifted out of one industry, less than one unit is available for other industries.
This loss of eﬀective capital represents capital adjustment costs.
2.1.3 Household utility and the supply of primary factors
Households obtain utility from consumption of the two ﬁnal goods Y and C. Aggre-
gate emissions E, labor supply L, and capital supply K produce disutility.8 Households
maximize the utility function
U = u[m(g(Yh,C h),z(K,L)),E], (7)
7This supply function can be interpreted as a multi-product ﬁrm that employs aggregate capital as
an input to produce three outputs: namely, the three capital stocks Ki (i = x,y,c).
8In a fully dynamic model, the cost of supplying capital is current consumption foregone when
resources are devoted to investment instead of consumption. We include capital in the utility function
to account for the cost of capital supply in our static model, which does not deal with investment
explicitly. An alternative interpretation of K is as highly specialized labor which, in contrast with other
labor, is imperfectly mobile across sectors.
5with
∂g
∂Yh,
∂g
∂Ch, ∂m
∂g , ∂m
∂z , ∂u
∂m > 0, and ∂u
∂E, ∂z
∂L, ∂z
∂K < 0. Yh and Ch denote household
consumption of, respectively, the dirty and clean ﬁnal goods. Since the utility function is
weakly separable in environmental quality, such quality does not directly aﬀect household
decisions.
Households earn labor and capital income. Both types of income are taxed at the
same proportional rate T. Uniform tax rates on capital and labor income are optimal,
given that capital and labor are weakly separable in utility from consumption.9 The
household budget constraint is given by
PcCh + PyYh =( 1− T)(WL+ RK + Π),
where R denotes the ideal price index associated with the transformation function (6)
and Π represents lump-sum subsidies.
2.1.4 Government budget
The government faces the following budget constraint:
PcΛ + Π + SY + SkyKy + SkxKx = TeE + TxX + T(Π + WL+ RK), (8)
where Λ denotes government spending (on the clean good C).
2.1.5 Market equilibrium
Equilibrium in the markets for the two ﬁnal goods requires that
Yh + Ya = Y,
and
Λ + Ch + Ca = C.
With perfectly mobile labor, labor market equilibrium is given by
L = Lx + Ly + Lc.
9A more complex structure might incorporate a utility function with which uniformity of factor tax
rates is not optimal, and/or a tax system that did not include uniform rates. Such complications would
not be particularly useful in the present study, since they would not be expected to exert signiﬁcant
inﬂuences on the industry-distributional eﬀects of pollution policies or the costs of compensation.
62.2 Policy experiments
We explore several policies that achieve given targets for pollution abatement. The
emissions tax and fuel (intermediate input) tax policies involve Te and Tx, respectively.
In the absence of uncertainty, the two command-and-control policies are equivalent to
combinations of taxes and subsidies.10 In particular, the technology mandate can be
modelled as a revenue-neutral combination of a subsidy to the intermediate input (i.e.,
a negative value for Tx) and a tax on emissions Te > 0:
TxX + TeE =0 . (9)
Similarly, we represent the performance standard as a revenue-neutral combination
of an output subsidy S>0 and an emissions tax Te > 0:
SY − TeE =0 .
In general, these policies aﬀect tax bases and thus can have revenue impacts.11 In
order to keep a balanced budget, the government adjusts the factor tax T while leaving
real government spending Λ constant.
For small policy shocks, the model can be solved analytically by log-linearizing it
around its initial equilibrium.12 Unless indicated otherwise, small letters will stand for
relative (percentage) changes of the variables denoted by the corresponding capital let-
ters. Greek letters will represent either elasticities or shares in the initial equilibrium.
In solving the model, we assume that the upstream and downstream pollution-related
industries X and Y are small compared to the rest of the economy. This enables us to
ignore eﬀects on the real wage rate W/Pc when solving for output and emissions in the
upstream and downstream industries. We adopt Pc as the numeraire.
2.3 Eﬃciency Impacts
Our measure for the overall eﬃciency impact is the compensating variation, which for
ease of notation we express relative to the output of the downstream industry.
10Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) demonstrate this equivalence.
11Even the command-and-control policies aﬀect aggregate public revenues because the revenue-
neutrality between their tax and subsidy components applies only at the level of industry Y , the targeted
industry. These policies can thus change overall revenues by aﬀecting the tax base elsewhere in the
economy.
12This initial equilibrium may involve either zero abatement or a strictly positive level of abatement.
7As shown in the appendix, the overall marginal eﬃciency cost ψ of a small change
in environmental policy can be split into two components, with one representing an eﬃ-
ciency cost directly connected with abatement, and the other representing the eﬃciency
cost related to lump-sum compensation:
ψ = −λΩ + μπ(1 − T), (10)
We refer to the ﬁrst right-hand term in (10) as the intrinsic abatement cost.I t
is the cost of pollution abatement, apart from any eﬀect directly related to lump-sum
compensation. This term applies under all of the policies considered. We refer to the
second right-hand term in (10) as the lump-sum compensation cost. This additional
term applies only when compensation is provided in the form of lump-sum tax credits.13
We elaborate on these two terms below.
2.3.1 Eﬃciency Costs for Policies without Compensation
Under policies with no proﬁts constraint, the marginal eﬃciency cost involves only the
intrinsic abatement cost, -λΩ.T h e λ component of this impact stands for the marginal
cost of public funds — the marginal cost in terms of household income of raising one
additional dollar of government revenue. The appendix shows that in this model λ
equals 1
1−εu(T/(1−T)),w h e r eεu denotes the uncompensated elasticity of factor supply
with respect to factor income.
The other element in the intrinsic abatement cost, Ω,r e ﬂects the erosion of the tax
base resulting from the environmental policy. In the case of the emissions tax, the
expression for Ω is:
Ω = αy
ee, (11a)
where α
y
e ≡ TeE/(Py + S)Y stands for the emissions tax payment relative to the value
of output in the downstream (Y ) industry. For a reduction in emissions (i.e., emissions
abatement) Ω is negative, representing the loss of emission-tax revenue as a result of
the emissions reduction. Multiplication of Ω by the eﬃciency cost of raising a dollar of
revenue (λ) yields the eﬃciency impact of a unit change in emissions.
The loss of tax base, Ω,d i ﬀers under the other policies. Under the fuel tax, Ω is
given by:
13When compensation is in the form of reductions in marginal tax rates on capital, the eﬃciency cost
of such compensation is captured within the intrinsic abatement cost, as explained below.
8Ω =
Tx
Px
αy
xx, (11b)
where α
y
x ≡ (PxX)/(Py + S)Y is the share of payments to the upstream (X) industry
relative to the value of the Y industry. The right-hand side then equals the change in
fuel tax payments when the use of X is curtailed incrementally.
Under the technology mandate, the expression for Ω amounts to:
Ω = αy
ee +
Tx
Px
αy
xx, (11c)
which combines the eﬀects of an emissions tax and a fuel tax. Tx < 0 represents the
subsidy component of the technology mandate.
Finally, the expression for Ω in the case of the performance standard is:
Ω = αy
ee −
S
Py + S
y, (11d)
which combines the eﬀect of an emissions tax with a revenue-neutral subsidy, S,t o
output of the downstream industry.
The intrinsic eﬃciency cost has two properties that apply under all four policy types.
First, under all policies, at initial abatement (i.e., the ﬁrst unit), Ω is zero and thus the
intrinsic eﬃciency cost is zero as well. Under the emissions tax, Ω is zero at initial
abatement because the cost share α
y
e is inﬁnitesimal as Te goes to zero. Under the fuel
tax, the term Tx
Pxα
y
xx is arbitrarily close to zero at initial abatement because Tx goes
to zero. Under the performance standard, the emissions-tax component (ﬁrst right-
hand-side term) and output-subsidy component (second right-hand-side term) of (11d)
each go to zero when abatement is arbitrarily small. Similarly, under the technology
mandate, the emissions-tax component and input-subsidy component (the Tx contained
in the second right-hand-side term) each go to zero.
The intuition for the zero initial impact is that each channel for abatement — input-
substitution, end-of-pipe treatment, and output-demand reduction — involves inﬁnites-
imal costs at the ﬁrst unit of abatement. Firms enjoy private marginal beneﬁts from
being able to produce pollution in the form of less expensive fuel mixes, less extensive
equipment, and (from lower output prices) higher output demand. A proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrm equates its marginal beneﬁts of additional emissions along any of these channels
to the marginal cost of emissions. In the absence of regulation, the marginal cost of
emissions is zero; hence, the marginal beneﬁt from an increment to emissions along any
9one of these channels is zero as well. Thus, the ﬁrst unit of emissions reduction along
any of these channels involves a marginal net private cost (foregone private net marginal
beneﬁt) of zero.
A second common feature of the marginal intrinsic eﬃciency cost is that it rises with
the extent of abatement. Greater abatement involves increased use of some combination
of the the channels of input substitution, output-demand reductions, and end-of-pipe-
treatment. If production functions are concave, greater input-substitution involves
increasing marginal costs. Furthermore, convex utility (downward sloping demand
curves) implies that greater output reduction entails increasing marginal welfare costs.
Finally, our emissions function (see (17)) involves rising marginal costs of end-of-pipe
treatment.14
Beyond incremental abatement, the intrinsic eﬃciency costs diﬀer across policies.
As indicated in prior studies15, the emissions tax has an advantage over other policies in
terms of these costs because it yields appropriate incentives for end-of-pipe treatment,
input substitution, and output-demand reduction (from higher output prices). The tax
on the intermediate (fuel) input exploits only the channels of input substitution and
output cuts. The command and control policies also exploit a subset of channels,
with the technology mandate primarily engaging the end-of-pipe treatment channel and
the performance standard including both end-of-pipe treatment and input substitution.
The rankings of the fuel tax, technology mandate, and performance standards in terms
of the intrinsic eﬃciency cost thus depend on the relative ease of input substitution,
end-of-pipe treatment, and output-demand reduction. This determines the relative
opportunity cost of neglecting one or more of these channels. We explore this issue
numerically in Section 3 below.
2.3.2 Eﬃciency Costs of Policies Involving Compensation
Compensation via Tax Credits
Compensation is required to maintain capital income or equity value to owners of the
pollution-related industries. We shall often refer to the proﬁts constraint as the equity
value neutrality (EVN) requirement. When policies include compensation that takes
14Constant or even declining marginal costs for end-of-pipe treatment are a possibility, but rising
marginal costs seem most consistent with empirical cases such as the use of electrostatic scrubbers for
reducing smokestack emissions of sulfur dioxide.
15See, for example, Goulder, Parry, Williams and Burtraw (1999).
10the form of lump-sum tax credits, the second term in (10), namely μπ(1 − T),u s u a l l y
is non-zero. This term represents the lump-sum compensation cost. In this term, π
stands for the value of the lump-sum credit needed to compensate capital owners in
the polluting industries (again expressed relative to output in the downstream sector).
μ represents the marginal excess burden from the additional factor taxation needed to
provide the compensating tax credit. As shown in the appendix, μ can be written as
εc[T/(1−T)]
1−εu[T/(1−T)] ,w h e r eεc is the compensated factor supply elasticity.
Under the emissions tax and fuel tax policies, ﬁrms ordinarily suﬀer losses of proﬁt
and positive compensation is required to achieve equity value neutrality. In these cases,
compensation via lump-sum tax credits introduces an extra eﬃciency cost relative to the
case without compensation. The reason is that when emissions reductions are achieved
through taxes, ﬁrms are required to pay the tax for whatever emissions they continue to
generate (under the emissions tax) or for whatever amount of fuel they continue to utilize
(under the fuel tax). Since this revenue transfer to the government is non-incremental,
the magnitude of the required tax credit is signiﬁcant as well. This produces a ﬁrst-
order eﬃciency cost, given by the product of the required credit (π(1 − T))a n dt h e
marginal excess burden (μ).
Under command-and-control policies, the lump-sum compensation cost diﬀers from
this cost under tax policies. This reﬂects diﬀerences in the incidence and associated
diﬀerences in required levels of compensation. The polluting industries tend to bear
a smaller burden under the command-and-control policies (performance standard and
technology mandate) than under the tax policies. This occurs because the command-
and-control policies eﬀectively include subsidies to the use of the intermediate input or
to output of the ﬁnal good Y .16 Indeed, under these policies the polluting industries
do not transfer ﬁscal resources to the government. Hence, they require little or no
compensation.17
Compensation via Cuts in Marginal Tax Rates on Sector-SpeciﬁcC a p i t a l
We also explore compensation in the form of reductions in marginal tax rates on
capital employed in the polluting industries. In this case, only the intrinsic abatement
cost applies, though for a given environmental policy instrument this cost generally will
16See Fullerton and Heutel (2006) for an analysis comparing the long-run incidence of various
command-and-control policies.
17Indeed, in some cases, certain ﬁrms can enjoy higher proﬁts under a performance standard than
in the absence of compensation. The numerical model obtains this result for a performance standard,
when relatively little abatement is required (see Section 3).
11be greater than if the policy involved no compensation. Compensation in the form
of reduced capital tax rates raises the marginal intrinsic abatement cost by increasing
the marginal costs of the output-reduction and input-substitution channels. Reduced
marginal capital taxes lower the marginal costs of production, thereby working toward
lower output prices and higher demand. Since total output is higher, greater abatement
eﬀort is needed to achieve a given reduction in emissions relative to the situation without
compensation. Similarly, lower capital tax rates work toward greater demand for the
fuel input (insofar as fuel and capital are complements in production). To the extent
that producers aim to reduce emissions by lowering the fuel input, they must counter
this positive impact on fuel use, and thus the opportunity cost of reducing emissions is
higher. Indeed, the policies necessitate greater use of the output-reduction and input-
substitution channels, which involve rising marginal costs. The rising marginal costs
induce ﬁrms to make greater use of end-of-pipe treatment as well, to the point where
the marginal costs of each channel are equal.
Relative Eﬃciency Cost of Alternative Compensation Mechanisms
One might expect that compensation through sector-speciﬁc cuts in marginal tax
rates would always involve lower eﬃciency costs than compensation through lump-sum
transfers, since such compensation does not require the government to raise factor taxes
to ﬁnance lump-sum transfers. However, this is not the case. The relative eﬃciency
cost of achieving compensation through lump-sum transfers versus sector-speciﬁcc u t si n
marginal tax rates depends on the extent of abatement. At initial (low) levels of abate-
ment, sector-speciﬁc marginal rate cuts have a cost advantage. As discussed above,
lump-sum compensation initially has a ﬁrst-order eﬃciency cost, while marginal rate
cuts initially involve no such cost. However, at higher levels of abatement, the eﬃ-
ciency advantage of marginal rate cuts declines. As mentioned, the intrinsic abatement
cost associated with achieving a given level of abatement impact (the ﬁrst term on the
right-hand side of 10) is larger under recycling through sector-speciﬁc marginal tax cuts
than under lump-sum credits. As the required amount of abatement becomes large, this
intrinsic cost component becomes more important compared to the lump-sum compen-
sation cost. The cost of output reduction, input substitution, and end-of-pipe treatment
rise with abatement on account of convex utility functions, concave production functions
and convex end-of-pipe abatement. As a result, when required abatement is extensive,
marginal abatement costs are large and the eﬃciency with which abatement occurs be-
comes relatively more important. At suﬃciently high levels of abatement, the marginal
12instrinsic abatement cost (i.e. the ﬁrst right-hand term in (10)) therefore dominates the
lump-sum compensation cost (i.e. the second right-hand term in (10)). Correspond-
ingly, at high levels of abatement, recycling through sector-speciﬁc tax cuts generates
larger overall eﬃciency costs: the higher intrinsic abatement costs from such recycling
dominate its initial eﬃciency advantage relative to lump-sum compensation. Numerical
simulations presented in the next section illustrate this phenomenon.
2.3.3 Policy Rankings in Terms of Overall Eﬃciency Cost
How does the equity value neutrality (EVN) constraint aﬀect the relative eﬃciency costs
of the various environmental policies? As discussed earlier, emissions taxes have a cost
advantage in the absence of a proﬁts constraint. Once one introduces this constraint,
however, the emissions tax’s advantage can disappear. As with the relative eﬃciency
cost of lump-sum compensation compared to compensation through sector-speciﬁct a x
cuts, the relative eﬃciency cost of emission taxes compared to command-and-control
policies depends on the level of abatement.
Consider ﬁrst the case where compensation is provided through lump-sum transfers.
At incremental abatement, the intrinsic abatement cost component is inﬁnitesimal (un-
der all policy instruments); hence, diﬀerences in policy costs reﬂect diﬀerences in the
lump-sum compensation component. Since the emissions tax requires the most compen-
sation, it involves the highest lump-sum compensation cost, and thus the highest overall
cost. As abatement becomes more extensive, however, the intrinsic abatement cost
component gains relative importance. Intuitively, at high levels of abatement, marginal
costs of abatement are high, so that the eﬃciency with which abatement occurs becomes
important. Since the command-and-control policies have a disadvantage in intrinsic
abatement eﬃciency (fewer channels for abatement are employed), this disadvantage
becomes magniﬁed relative to their advantage in terms of the compensation-related eﬃ-
ciency cost. An emissions tax may thus have higher overall costs than the other policies
when the abatement target is lax, and lower overall costs when the abatement target is
stringent. The numerical simulations below bear this out.18
18In the present study, the higher cost of emissions taxes arises when compensation is lump-sum in
nature. This result is reminiscent of earlier studies that have shown how emissions taxes can be more
costly than other instruments when government budget balance must be achieved through lump-sum
transfers. (See Parry and Oates (2000), Goulder et al. (1999) and Fullerton and Metcalf (2001)). In
all of these studies, the use of lump-sum payments (and the associated need to ﬁnance such payments
through distortionary taxes) lies behind the higher cost of the emissions tax.
13For similar reasons, the cost rankings of the two command-and-control policies can
change as well as abatement becomes more extensive. The technology mandate em-
ploys only the input-substitution channel, while the performance standard engages both
input substitution and output reduction. As a result, the technology mandate is at a
disadvantage in terms of the intrinsic abatement cost. However, compared to the perfor-
m a n c es t a n d a r d ,i ti sm o r ee ﬀective in protecting the upstream industry since it contains
the drop in demand for the intermediate (fuel) input. Thus, it involves lower lump-sum
compensation costs. This latter factor counts most heavily at low levels of pollution
abatement, when the intrinsic abatement cost is less important. At these abatement
levels, therefore, the technology mandate is less costly than the performance standard.
However, the cost ranking is reversed at higher abatement levels, when diﬀerences in
intrinsic abatement costs become larger.
Now consider the case where compensation is provided through lower sector-speciﬁc
marginal tax rates. In this case, only the ﬁrst right-hand term in (10) applies (the
intrinsic abatement cost), although compensation aﬀects the magnitude of this term.
At initial (inﬁnitesimal) abatement, all policies have inﬁnitesimal intrinsic abatement
costs. As abatement requirements become larger, the intrinsic abatement costs diﬀer.
As in policies without compensation, the rankings depend on the relative eﬀectiveness
with which the various abatement channels are exploited.19
3A N u m e r i c a l M o d e l
Here we develop and apply a numerical model in order to obtain quantitative results.
We brieﬂy describe the model here; a complete description is in a technical appendix,
available from www.stanford.edu/~goulder.
The formal structure of this numerical model is the same as that of the analytical
model of Section 2, except that the numerical model does not assume that the polluting
industries are inﬁnitely small compared to the rest of the economy. Moreover, since
this model is solved numerically, its solution does not rely on linearization techniques.
Thus we can consider the impacts of large policy changes.20
19Compensation in the form of sector-speciﬁc reductions in marginal tax rates can inﬂuence the relative
costs of the various abatement channels, and thereby inﬂuence the relative costs of the diﬀerent policies.
In our simulation experiments this impact on relative costs appears to be negligible.
20We also now consider total welfare impacts, as opposed to the marginal analysis of the previous
section.
143.1 Structure
3.1.1 Production and Factor Mobility
We adopt constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functional forms for the production
functions for the intermediate input X and the ﬁnal goods Y and C. Each industry
employs labor and capital as inputs, and industry Y employs the intermediate input X
as well. Speciﬁcally:
Y = γy
"
αyv
σy−1
σy +( 1− αy)L
σy−1
σy
y
# σy
σy−1
, (12)
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with
v = γv
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αvK
σv−1
σv
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σv−1
σv
¸ σv
σv−1
. (15)
To capture the imperfect mobility of capital across industries, we apply a CES capital
transformation function:
K = γk
"
αkK
σk−1
σk
x + βkK
σk−1
σk
y +( 1− αk − βk)K
σk−1
σk
c
# σk
σk−1
, (16)
The parameter σk controls the curvature of this function. We employ negative values
for σk so that the transformation function is bowed out from the origin. Successive
increments to the supply of any given type of capital thus require ever-larger sacriﬁces
of other types of capital, in keeping with increasing marginal adjustment costs. In
contrast to capital, labor is perfectly mobile across industries.
3.1.2 Emissions
Emissions are generated by the downstream industry Y . These are a function of that
industry’s use of fuel (X) and the resources devoted by that industry to end-of-pipe
15treatment. We adopt the following emissions function:
E
X
= γe
∙
1+βe
µ
g(Ya,C a)
X
¶ρe¸−1
ρe
βe > 0; 0 < ρe < 1 (17)
where the function g(Ya,C a), representing resources devoted to end-of-pipe treatment,
is a CES composite of the two ﬁnal goods. The emissions ratio E/X above can be
represented as γef(g/X). The function f(.) has the following desirable properties:
• f0(0) ⇒− ∞ .T h i s ﬁrst unit of end-of-pipe treatment is very productive in
cutting emissions. Accordingly, end-of-pipe treatment is positive if emissions are
constrained (implying a positive shadow price of pollution permits)
• f(∞)=0 . Pollution is eliminated completely if end-of-pipe treatment is very
large.
• f(0) = 1. Without any end-of-pipe treatment, pollution remains ﬁnite.
3.1.3 Household Utility (Goods Demand and Factor Supply)
The household utility function is CES:
U =
³
αgG
σu−1
σu + αzZ
σu−1
σu
´ σu
σu−1 , (18)
where G is a CES composite of Yh and Ch (the quantities of goods Y and C devoted to
household consumption21):
G =
Ã
αgyY
σg−1
σg
h + αgcC
σg−1
σg
h
! σg
σg−1
, (19)
and Z is a CES composite of labor supply and aggregate capital supply:
Z =
³
αzl(L − L)
σz−1
σz + αzk(K − K)
σz−1
σz
´ σz
σz−1 , (20)
and where L and K represent the maximum potential labor supply (endowment of labor
time) and capital supply, respectively. Note that this utility function does not account
for the welfare impact of changes in environmental quality. All of the policy costs
21The parameters of the function G are the same as those in the end-of-pipe-treatment function g in
(17) above.
16described in the results below should therefore be regarded as gross costs: they do not
net out the beneﬁts associated with policy-induced environmental improvements.
3.1.4 The Government
The government levies factor taxes and introduces the various environmental policies
discussed above. All revenues are returned to the private sector through marginal or
lump-sum cuts in factor taxes. The government’s budget constraint is:
PgΛ + Π(1 − T)+SkxKx + SkyKy = T[WL+ RxKx + RyKy + RcKc | {z }
]
factor tax revenue
+TEE + TxPxX − SY | {z }
environmental tax revenue
where, as before, PgΛ is a ﬁxed real government transfer to the households, Π is the
amount of tax credit given to the X and Y industries, and T, Te,a n dTx are the tax
rates on factors (labor, capital in industries X, Y ,a n dC), emissions, and output from
industry X, respectively. Total government revenue, shown on the right-hand side,
comes from these taxes net of the subsidies used to model the command-and-control
policies.22
3.2 Equilibrium Conditions
For the emissions tax, emissions permits, and fuel tax policies, the requirements of the
general equilibrium are that (1) household supply of labor must equal aggregate labor
demand by ﬁrms, (2) demand for capital by each industry i (i = x,y,c) must equal
the quantity supplied to that industry, (3) pollution emissions must equal the pollution
level stipulated by environmental policy, and (4) government revenue must equal real
transfers to households. The before-tax wage is the numeraire. The model identiﬁes
the primary “prices” that cause these four types of equilibrium conditions to be met.
These are the equilibrium rental prices for capital, the emissions tax rate (or price of
emissions permits), and the marginal factor tax rate T. These prices determine output
prices and the real wage. Walras’s law implies that the labor market clears when all
the other markets clear.
22Households’ revenues from the tax credit are also subject to tax at the marginal capital tax rate.
17For the technology mandate and performance standard, a further condition is in-
troduced. As mentioned in the previous section, a technology mandate imposed on
industry Y is equivalent to a revenue-neutral combination of an emissions tax and a
subsidy to the polluting input X, while the performance standard imposed on that in-
dustry is a revenue-neutral combination of emissions tax and subsidy to Y .W e s i m u l a t e
these two command-and-control policies as combinations of this sort. For these policies,
the model adds the condition that the combination of the emissions tax and a subsidy
to either X or Y is revenue-neutral.
Table 1 lists the policies considered and summarizes how they are implemented in
the model.
3.3 Data
We apply the numerical model to the U.S., letting Y represent the electricity industry
and C the other U.S. ﬁnal goods industries. X refers to the industry producing (ex-
tracting) fossil fuels — coal, crude petroleum and natural gas. The use of these fuels by
the electricity (Y ) industry leads to emissions. We focus on control of sulfur dioxide
(SO2) emissions.
Table 2 indicates the inter-industry ﬂows in our data set. These ﬂows derive from
the U.S. Commerce Department Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Benchmark Input &
Output Tables for 1992. The emissions data come from the 1992 column of Table 12.6
of the Energy Information Agency’s Annual Energy Review 1999.
Table 3 displays the model’s parameters. The elasticities of substitution in pro-
duction are taken from the disaggregated general equilibrium data set developed by
Barreto, Gurney, Xie, and Goulder (2002). For the Y industry, we calibrate the model
to generate production and abatement elasticities consistent with those from the de-
tailed “HAIKU” model of the U.S. electricity industry developed at Resources for the
Future. The substitution elasticities σy and σv imply that, compared to capital, labor
is a much better substitute for X.
The capital adjustment parameter σk is chosen so as to yield capital responses
roughly consistent with ﬁndings from a survey by Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (2002)
indicating that the elasticity of investment with respect to the cost of capital is in the
range of .25-.4.
We calibrate the model to generate uncompensated and compensated labor supply
18elasticities of 0.15 and 0.4, respectively.23 This is consistent with the survey by Russek
(1996). Together, these two elasticity targets yield the values for the elasticity of
substitution between leisure and capital and the benchmark ratio of total (labor plus
leisure) time to labor time. These values imply a marginal excess burden of 0.24 for
labor taxes. As in the analytical model, capital supply elasticities are set equal to labor
supply elasticities.24 In this model, employing the same tax rate on both capital and
labor income implies that the marginal excess burden for capital taxes is thus the same
as that for labor taxes.
3.4 Simulation Results
3.4.1 Cost Eﬀectiveness and Incidence — No EVN Constraint
We apply the model to examine the impacts of emissions taxes, performance standards,
technology mandates, and fuel taxes.25 Our ﬁrst experiments assess the eﬃciency and
incidence impacts of these instruments in the absence of compensation to achieve equity
value neutrality (EVN).
Figure 1 compares the policy costs, as measured by the negative of the equivalent
variation.26 The emissions tax is the most cost eﬀective, followed by the two “command-
and-control” policies (the technology mandate and performance standard). The fuel tax
is the least cost eﬀective and is omitted from the ﬁgure for scale — its costs may be
found in Table 4. As indicated in Section 2, the emissions tax is most cost eﬀective
because it eﬃciently exploits all three channels for abatement: input substitution, end-
of-pipe treatment, and output reduction. The other policies fail to exploit at least
one of these channels. The performance standard — equivalent to the combination of
23To calibrate the model to these labor supply parameters, we numerically solve the household’s utility
maximization problem with given prices and observe the change in labor supply resulting from a change
in the after-tax wage. We solve this as a constrained optimization problem, where the amount of capital
supplied is ﬁxed. To calculate the compensated elasticity, we also alter the household’s income so that
utility remains unchanged despite the change in the after-tax wage.
24This is accomplished in calibration by setting the ratio K/K equal to the ratio L/L.
25Because there is no uncertainty in this model, policies involving tradable emissions permits are
equivalent to various emissions tax policies. If permits are initially allocated through an auction, an
emissions tax of Te is equivalent to a system involving auctioned permits that yields a permit price equal
to Te. Both policies will lead to the same economic outcomes, including the extent of abatement. A
system of tradable permits in which the permits are initially allocated free is equivalent to an emissions
tax with a lump-sum rebate equal to the total tax revenues. This latter system would in fact cause
proﬁts in the Y industry to be higher than in the unregulated status quo (see Bovenberg and Goulder,
2001).
26Note that the equivalent variation does not account for welfare impacts associated with improved
environmental quality. Thus, the negative of our equivalent variation indicates gross policy costs.
19emissions tax and subsidy to output — leads to ineﬃciently low output prices and thus
makes relatively little use of the output-reduction channel. Similarly, the technology
mandate — equivalent to the combination of an emissions tax and a subsidy to the
fuel input — yields ineﬃciently low incentives for substitution away from the pollution-
generating fuel, as well as for output reduction (the subsidy to the input leads to output
prices that are lower than those under the emissions tax). The fuel tax provides no
incentive for end-of-pipe treatment. The exceptionally high cost of the fuel tax in our
model indicates that, under central values for parameters, the absence of the end-of-pipe
channel is especially important.27
Table 4 indicates the price impacts of each policy, for abatement of 10, 25, and
75 percent. The performance standard leads to the smallest change in the demand
(consumer) price of the downstream good Y b e c a u s ei ti se q u i v a l e n tt oa ne m i s s i o n s
tax and output subsidy. Indeed, the price of that good falls (slightly) in the case of
10 percent abatement. The technology mandate (which eﬀectively subsidizes the fuel
input to the downstream good industry) also has a relatively small impact on the price
of the downstream good. The emissions tax and fuel tax yield the largest impacts on
the price of the downstream good Y . The impact is especially large in the case of the
fuel tax. Because this policy does not exploit the channel of end-of-pipe treatment,
a very high fuel tax is needed to induce suﬃcient input-substitution to meet a given
abatement target. This high tax leads to a large increase in cost of the fuel input and
the price of the output Y .
Table 4 also displays the incidence (i.e., proﬁta n dw a g e )i m p a c t so ft h ed i ﬀerent
policies. Because of their subsidy components, the technology mandate and performance
standard have the smallest adverse proﬁt impacts on the downstream industry Y .T h e y
also exert the smallest adverse impacts on proﬁts to the upstream industry, reﬂecting
the fact that these policies reduce only slightly the demand for the upstream good. The
impacts of these two command-and-control policies diﬀer in that the technology mandate
protects especially the upstream industry, while the performance standard oﬀers special
protection to the downtream industry, in keeping with the diﬀerent subsidy components
of the two policies. The fuel tax imposes the largest burden on the upstream- and
downsteam industries, reﬂecting the need to impose a relatively high tax rate to reach
given levels of abatement when the channel of end-of-pipe treatment is not employed.
27In the central case, the parameter ρe (calibrated from the HAIKU model) implies fairly elastic
response of end-of-pipe treatment to the price of emissions. Hence, the fuel tax’s failure to engage the
channel of end-of-pipe treatment is a signiﬁcant disadvantage in the model’s central case.
203.4.2 Cost-Eﬀectiveness in the Presence of the EVN Constraint
Compensation via Tax Credits
We now examine the relative costs when the policies must include compensation to
the pollution-related industries. These costs depend on the way that compensation is
provided. We ﬁr s ti n v e s t i g a t et h ec o s t sw h e nc o m p e nsation is provided in the form of
lump-sum tax payments or credits to both of the pollution-related industries, that is, to
both X and Y .
Table 5 compares, for each policy, the aggregate policy costs in the presence and
absence of the EVN constraint. The additional costs implied by the constraint are
largest for the emissions tax and (especially) the fuel tax because these policies require
the most compensation (in the form of tax credits). To preserve budget balance, the
government must ﬁnance the tax credits by signiﬁcantly increasing tax rates on factors of
production. This raises the costs of the emissions tax and fuel tax considerably relative
to the case without EVN. In contrast, under the command-and-control policies, much
less compensation is needed, so for these policies the marginal factor tax rates in the
cases with and without EVN are not much diﬀerent. Hence, the added eﬃciency cost
of the EVN constraint is smaller under command and control.
In fact, in keeping with the analysis of Section 2, the EVN requirement reverses the
rankings of the various instruments in terms of overall costs (including the lump-sum
compensation cost). As shown in Figure 2, the EVN constraint makes the costs of
the emissions tax higher than those of the command-and-control policies, for all except
very high amounts of abatement. The emissions tax’s need for higher compensation (at
any level of abatement) implies large compensation-related costs relative to those of the
other policies. The relatively high compensation costs work against the emissions tax’s
advantage in terms of the intrinsic abatement cost. Figure 2 shows that, at low and
moderate levels of abatement, the emissions tax’s disadvantage in terms of compensation
costs overwhelms its advantage in terms of intrinsic abatement costs. Only at very high
levels of abatement does the intrinsic abatement advantage dominate. When very high
levels of abatement are called for, the other policies’ neglect of at least one important
abatement channel ultimately leads to very high costs that oﬀset their advantages related
to compensation. Economists have long considered emissions taxes as a more cost-
eﬀective instrument than command-and-control policies. These results indicate that
the need for compensation can reverse the rankings in terms of cost eﬀectiveness.
21At low levels of abatement, the compensation requirement also reverses the rankings
between the two command-and-control policies. At less than 25 percent abatement, the
performance standard now emerges as more costly than the technology mandate. This
reﬂects the need for greater compensation under the performance standard, as analyzed
in Section 2. Thus, at low levels of abatement the rankings between the emissions tax,
performance standard and technology mandate are completely reversed when the EVN
contraint is imposed.
Compensation via Industry-speciﬁc Cuts in Capital Tax Rates
We now examine the relative costs when compensation is achieved through reductions
in the marginal rates on capital income in the X and Y industries. The bottom set of
rows in Table 5 shows the results from these experiments.
The required levels of compensation under the various environmental policies are
very similar to those in the case where industries were oﬀered tax credits. In terms
of overall policy cost, the choice of compensation method is more important for the
emissions tax than for the command-and-control policies. Under the emissions tax, it
is somewhat more eﬃcient to compensate through marginal rate cuts in capital taxes
than through lump-sum credits. When compensation is provided through marginal
rate cuts, capital tax rates can be lower than would be the case under lump-sum tax
credits (particularly in industries X and Y ). This reduces the eﬃciency costs. For
the command-and-control policies, in contrast, the choice of compensation method has
relatively little impact on the eﬃciency cost, since the compensation requirements of
these policies are relatively small.
Figure 3 compares the costs of diﬀerent policies in the case where EVN is accom-
plished through marginal rate cuts. A comparison with Figure 1 indicates that each
policy’s costs are higher than in the case without compensation, while policy rankings
are unchanged.28
We also consider the relative costs of the two diﬀerent compensation methods, hold-
ing ﬁxed the choice of environmental policy instrument. Marginal rate cuts are in general
better at low levels of abatement, but worse at high levels.29 As discussed in Section
2, capital tax cuts reduce the eﬀectiveness of the input-substitution and output-demand
28As mentioned in Section 2, sector-speciﬁct a xc u t sc o u l da ﬀect relative policy costs by inﬂuencing
the relative costs of the abatement channels. However, this eﬀect is negligible in our simulations.
29This implies that for intermediate levels of abatement some combination of lump-sum compensation
and marginal compensation will be more eﬃcient than either instrument alone.
22channels and thus result in less eﬃcient pollution abatement. Ineﬃcient abatement
is especially important when the abatement target is stringent. For example, under
a fuel tax, the cost of compensation through marginal rate cuts is lower than the cost
through tax credits if the required abatement is less than 10 percent, but becomes
higher if greater abatement is called for. Similarly, under the emissions tax, the cost
with compensation through marginal rate cuts overtakes the cost through lump-sum
compensation once the abatement requirement exceeds 71 percent.
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
Tables 6 and 7 display the sensitivity of our results to changes in key parameters. In
Table 6, which focuses on abatement levels of 25 percent, the ﬁrst column of numbers
gives the eﬃciency cost of the emissions tax in the absence of compensation. The
remaining columns indicate the ratio of eﬃciency costs for the policy in question to the
cost in the ﬁrst column. For each of the four policy instruments considered, we show
these ratios both for the no-compensation case and for the case with compensation via
corporate tax credits. Table 7 indicates the critical levels of abatement at which the
eﬃciency rankings of policies change.
End-of-pipe treatment
Higher values for the parameter βe imply greater ease of end-of-pipe treatment;
when βe is zero, end-of-pipe treatment is not possible (the ratio of emissions to fuel
use is ﬁxed). Table 6 shows that the cost of abatement rises and the relative cost of
command-and-control policies increases as end-of-pipe treatment is made more diﬃcult.
In the case without end-of-pipe treatment, where βe equals zero, the technology mandate
is no longer deﬁned, and the fuel tax becomes equivalent to the emissions tax. For low
values of βe, the high relative cost of the performance standard means that the output-
demand channel is important in reducing emissions. Since the performance standard
omits this channel, its compensation-related advantage becomes small relative to its
eﬃciency disadvantage. Hence, the critical abatement percentage beyond which the
emissions tax becomes more eﬃcient is lower, as indicated in Table 7. Even in the
extreme case where βe equals zero, however, the performance standard still outperforms
the emissions tax for low enough abatement targets.
Capital adjustment costs
23The parameter σk controls the adjustment costs in moving capital across sectors:
higher values of σk imply less mobile capital. With lower capital mobility, owners of
capital in the X or Y industries require greater compensation. The capital adjustment
costs have relatively little eﬀect on the intrinsic eﬃciency costs of abatement in the ﬁrst
column of Table 6, but have a large eﬀect on compensation-related costs, as indicated
by the ratio of costs with and without EVN for the various policies. Since this para-
meter directly controls how much industry compensation is needed for environmental
policy, it has a large impact in Table 7. The compensation-related advantage of the
command-and-control policies becomes more and more important as capital adjustment
costs rise. Indeed, in the high-cost case, the performance standard is more eﬃcient
than the emissions tax until 90 percent abatement.
Elasticity of demand for output from industry Y
Easier substitution between C and Y in demand increases the importance of the
output-demand eﬀect. This slightly lowers overall abatement costs and increases the
relative cost of the command-and-control policies (because they make less use of the
output-demand channel). The higher elasticity also increases somewhat the need for
compensation, since the Y sector shrinks more under environmental policy. These two
eﬀects (higher intrinsic cost of command-and-control policies as well as greater need
for compensation) compete in their impact in Table 7. They almost exactly oﬀset
each other for the performance standard with the crossover remaining at 79 percent
abatement.
Factor supply elasticity
The elasticity in the outer nest of the utility function, σu, controls the elasticity
with which the household supplies labor and capital. Higher values for this elasticity
mean that existing factor taxes lead to larger distortions in factor markets, and a higher
marginal cost of public funds. A higher factor-supply elasticity raises the eﬃciency
cost of providing compensation through corporate tax credits, since this compensation
must be ﬁnanced through higher factor taxes (which now have a higher eﬃciency cost).
Thus, when the EVN constraint is imposed, the relative advantage of the command-
and-control policies increases with the size of the factor supply elasticity. For example,
the ﬁrst row of Table 6 shows that under central values for parameters the cost of the
emissions tax with EVN is about 24 percent higher than the cost of the technology
24mandate with EVN (1.439/1.156). With the high factor-supply elasticity, in contrast,
the emissions tax’s cost is about 53 percent higher (1.889/1.232). Higher factor-supply
elasticities likewise imply higher crossover points in Table 7.
Input substitution between capital and fuel
The parameter σv controls the ease of subsitution between the intermediate input
(fuel) and capital in the Y industry. A higher value for this parameter thus reduces
the relative cost of policies that rely heavily on the fuel-capital substitution channel.
Hence, the relative cost of the fuel tax and performance standard fall when σv takes
a higher value. A high value for σv is especially disadvantageous for the technology
mandate, since this policy does not exploit the fuel-capital substitution channel. Easier
fuel substitution implies greater need for compensation to the upstream industry but less
need for the downstream industry. The change in overall compensation requirements is
nearly neutral, so the eﬀects in Table 7 are driven primarily by the changes in relative
intrinsic eﬃciency. With a higher substitution elasticity, the performance standard
is more eﬃcient than the emission tax over a wider range of abatement (because of
the former policy’s heavier reliance on fuel switching), while the technology mandate
becomes less eﬃcient more quickly than the emissions tax does.
Industries compensated
Here we explore how results change when only the downstream industry receives
compensation instead of both the upstream and downstream industries. Narrowing
the compensation net lowers the cost ratios for all policies, since less compensation is
needed. The eﬀect is particularly strong for the performance standard, which tends to
hurt the upstream industry while preserving proﬁts in the downstream industry. The
results in Table 7 are as expected, with the compensation-related eﬃciency advantage
of the command-and-control policies becoming somewhat less important when only one
industry is compensated.
4 Conclusions
The political viability of a proposed environmental policy instrument can depend on
whether it is likely to avoid signiﬁcant proﬁt losses to major industrial stakeholders.
25Using analytically and numerically solved models, we investigate the incidence of various
environmental policy instruments and then explore how the aggregate costs of these
instruments change with the requirement that major pollution-related industries be
compensated for potential proﬁt losses.
We show that the added cost from the compensation requirement can be decomposed
into two components: (1) an increase in intrinsic abatement cost (the cost of utilizing the
channels of inputsubstitution, end-of-pipe treatment, and output cuts in order to achieve
pollution reductions), and (2) a cost directly associated with lump-sum compensation.
We explore how these cost components are aﬀected when compensation is provided either
through sector-speciﬁc tax credits or by way of sector-speciﬁc reductions in capital tax
rates. For each policy instrument, achieving compensation through tax credits raises
both cost components, while achieving compensation through reductions in capital tax
cuts raises only the intrinsic abatement cost.
Importantly, introducing the compensation requirement has very diﬀerent impacts
on the costs of diﬀerent policy instruments. Restoring proﬁts through tax credits, in
particular, raises the costs of emissions taxes considerably more than it raises the costs
of command-and-control policies such as performance standards and mandated tech-
nologies. This reﬂects the greater need for compensation under the emissions tax and
the associated larger increase in the second cost component, the lump-sum compensa-
tion cost. Thus, while emissions taxes generally are more cost eﬀective in the absence
of a compensation requirement, imposing this requirement can make the emissions tax
more costly than command-and-control policies. This result occurs when a small or
moderate amount of pollution abatement is required. When the abatement requirement
is very extensive, the emissions tax regains its status as the most cost-eﬀective instru-
ment; with extensive abatement, other policies suﬀer signiﬁcant increases in intrinsic
abatement costs, which causes overall costs to exceed those of the emissions tax, despite
lower compensation requirements.
The potential advantage (at low or modest levels of abatement) of command-and-
control policies reﬂects the fact that these policies eﬀectively include subsidy compo-
nents: a performance standard is equivalent to an emissions tax and output subsidy,
while a technology mandate is equivalent to an emissions tax and input subsidy. The
implicit subsidies limit the adverse proﬁt impacts of these policies, thereby reducing
the need for compensation. When equity value neutrality must be achieved through
tax credits, the command-and-control policies therefore have an advantage, since they
require less compensation through tax credits, which entail signiﬁcant eﬃciency costs.
26The introduction of a compensation requirement can thus signiﬁcantly alter the
cost-rankings of alternative environmental policy instruments. The extent to which the
rankings are changed depends on the degree of stringency of the abatement requirement.
Some limitations in this study deserve mention. The two models do not incorporate
uncertainty, nor do they capture heterogeneity among producers within given industries.
These elements can inﬂuence the cost rankings of policy instruments. Uncertainty is
associated with costs of monitoring and enforcement, and such costs generally diﬀer
across policies. In addition, when polluting ﬁrms have heterogeneous abatement costs
and regulators have imperfect information about such costs, incentive-based policies like
emissions taxes and fuel taxes may have an advantage over command-and-control poli-
cies in producing a cost-eﬀective allocation of pollution-reduction eﬀorts across ﬁrms.30
Despite these limitations, the present analysis reveals how the compensation requirement
aﬀects the absolute and relative costs of major environmental policy instruments.
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28Appendix: The Analytical Model
This appendix provides the details and derivation of the analytical results discussed in
Section 2. Part 1 derives expressions for supply and demand in the goods markets and
then solves for the equilibrium price changes resulting from environmental policy. Part
2 employs these equilibrium values to derive, for each of the four policy instruments
considered above, the overall eﬃciency costs (both abatement eﬃciency cost and lump-
sum compensation-related costs) that were presented in equations (10) through (11d) of
the main text. Finally, Part 3 decomposes the overall welfare eﬀect into the incidence
on the upstream- and downstream industries.
A.1 Equilibrium
A.1.1 Supply in the downstream industry
Competitive proﬁt-maximizing behavior by the downstream industry yields
(Py + S)
δh(.;.)
δV
δv(.;.)
δX
= Px + Tx + Te
δn
δX
, (A.1)
(Py + S)
δh(.;.)
δLy
= W, (A.2)
−Te
δn
δg
δg
δCa
= Pc; − Te
δn
δg
δg
δYa
= Py, (A.3)
(Py + S)
δh(.;.)
δV
δv(.;.)
δKy
= Ry − Sky. (A.4)
Loglinearizing the production function of the downstream industry (4) and employing
the ﬁrst-order conditions (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4) (and using the fact that the
emission function (5) exhibits constant returns to scale), we ﬁnd
y = ky +( 1− αy
v)(ly − v)+( 1− α
y
k)(x − ky), (A.5)
where α
y
k ≡ (Ry − Sky)Ky/((Ry − Sky)Ky +( Px + Tx)X + TeE + PcCa + PyYa), α
y
v ≡
((Ry −Sky)Ky +(Px+Tx)X +TeE +PcCa+PyYa)/(Py +S)Y =1−(WLy/(Py +S)Y ),
and v = α
y
kky +( 1− α
y
k)x.
With constant-returns-to-scale production and emissions functions, the relative change
in the output price is a weighted average of the relative changes in the input prices31
ˆ py + s =ˆ px + ˆ tx + ˆ te +ˆ ry − ˆ sky, (A.6)
where ˆ py ≡
Py
Py+Spy;ˆ px ≡ PxX
(Py+S)Y px; ˆ tx ≡ XdTx
(Py+S)Y ; ˆ te ≡ α
y
ete;ˆ ry ≡ α
y
vα
y
k
Ry
Ry−Skyry, ˆ sky ≡
31pc =0because Pc is the numeraire. Also w =0since the downstream- and upstream sectors are
too small to aﬀect the prices on the labor market. pc =0implies that the costs of abatement do not
change because, in line with our assumption that the upstream- and downstream industries are small
compared to the rest of the economy, the share of abatement produced by the downstream industry (i.e.
Ya) in aggregate abatement g(Ca;Ya) is only inﬁnitely small.
29KydSky
(Py+S)Y , where α
y
e ≡ TeE/(Py + S)Y stands for the cost shares of the emissions tax in
the ﬁnal-goods industry.
Capital supply is given by32
ky =ˆ σ
y
kˆ ry, (A.7)
where ˆ σ
y
k ≡
σ
y
k
α
y
vα
y
k
Ry−Sky
Ry and σ
y
k stands for the substitution elasticity between the
industry-speciﬁc capital services in the ﬁnal-goods sector and the capital services in
the rest of the economy.
Using (A.4), (A.2), and (A.1) to eliminate Py, and log-linearizing the results, we
arrive at the following two equations
x − ky =ˆ σv[ˆ ry − ˆ sky − (α
y
k/(1 − α
y
k))(ˆ px + ˆ tx + ˆ te)], (A.8)
ly − v =ˆ σyα
y
k[ˆ ry − ˆ sky +ˆ px + ˆ tx + ˆ te], (A.9)
where ˆ σv ≡ σv
α
y
vα
y
k
and σv stands for the substitution elasticity between the intermediate
input and capital in the composite v(.;.). ˆ σy ≡
σy
α
y
vα
y
k
and σy represents the substitution
elasticity between labor and the nest v(.;.) in the production function h(.;.) (see (4)).
Substituting (A.7), (A.8) and (A.9) into (A.5) to eliminate ky, x − ky, and ly − v, and
using (A.6) eliminate ˆ ry from the result, we write the supply of the ﬁnal good in terms
of its price, the price of the intermediate good, and the various policy instruments:
y = εy
yˆ py + εy
ys − εy
x[ˆ px + ˆ tx + ˆ te]+ˆ σ
y
kˆ sky, (A.10)
where
εy
y ≡ ˆ σ
y
k +ˆ σv(1 − α
y
k)+( 1− αy
v)α
y
kˆ σy, (A.11)
εy
x =ˆ σ
y
k +ˆ σv. (A.12)
A.1.2 Demand for the downstream good
Maximization of the utility function (7) yields
δg
δY
/
δg
δC
=
Py
Pc
.
Log-linearization of this equation gives rise to the demand function
y = −¯ σgˆ py, (A.13)
where ¯ σg ≡ σg
Py+S
Py and σg represents the substitution elasticity between the ﬁnal good
Y and other consumption goods C in the household sub-utility function g(.,.) (see (7)).
32This assumes that all households are well diversiﬁed so that income eﬀects can be ignored. Al-
ternatively, one can assume that a share γy of capital owners in the downtream industry is completely
specialized in this sector (i.e., only derives income from capital in this sector). In that case, the elasticity
σ
y
k in the following equation is replaced by (1 − γy)σ
y
k + γyεu,w h e r eεu stands for the uncompensated
elasticity of aggregate capital supply with respect to the rate of return.
30A.1.3 Supply in the upstream industry
Log-linearizing the production function of the upstream industry (1), we ﬁnd
xs = kx +( 1− αx
k)(lx − kx), (A.14)
where αx
k ≡ (Rx−Skx)Kx/PxX stands for the share of capital in output of the upstream
sector. With a constant-returns-to-scale production function, the relative change in the
output price is a weighted average of the relative changes in the input prices (note that
wages do not change)
ˆ px =ˆ rx − ˆ skx, (A.15)
where ˆ rx ≡ αx
kα
y
x
Rx
Rx−Skxrx and ˆ skx ≡ KxdSkx
(Py+S)Y with α
y
x ≡ PxX/((Py + S)Y ).
Capital supply is given by
kx =ˆ σx
kˆ rx, (A.16)
where σx
k ≡ σx
k
Rx−Skx
Rx /(αx
kα
y
x) and σx
k stands for the substitution elasticity between
the industry-speciﬁc capital services in the intermediate-goods industry and the capital
services in the rest of the economy.
Using (2) and (3) to eliminate Px and log-linearizing the results, we arrive at
lx − kx =ˆ σx(ˆ rx − ˆ skx), (A.17)
where ˆ σx ≡ σx/((αx
kα
y
x)) stands for the substitution elasticity between the two inputs
in the production of the intermediate good.
Substituting (A.16), (A.17), and (A.15) into (A.14) to eliminate kx, (lx − kx), and
rx, we write the supply of the ﬁnal good in terms of its price and the demand price of
the intermediate good
xs =ˆ σxˆ px +ˆ σx
kˆ skx, (A.18)
where ˆ σx ≡ ˆ σx
k +( 1− αx
k)ˆ σx denotes the supply elasticity.
A.1.4 Demand for the upstream good
By substituting (A.7) into (A.8) to eliminate ky and using (A.6) to eliminate ˆ ry from
the resulting expression, we can derive the impact on the demand for the intermediate
good as
x = εx
yˆ py − εx
x[ˆ px + ˆ tx + ˆ te]+ˆ σ
y
kˆ sky + εx
ys, (A.19)
where
εx
y ≡ ˆ σ
y
k +ˆ σv = εy
x,
εx
x =ˆ σ
y
k +
ˆ σv
(1 − α
y
k)
.
31A.1.5 Emissions
In order to ﬁnd emissions, we write the emission function (5) as X = φ(E,g(Ca;Ya)),
where φ(.,.) is homogenous of the ﬁrst degree in its arguments, and log-linearize to
arrive at
x = e +
α
y
v(1 − α
y
k) − α
y
x
Px+Tx
Px − α
y
e
α
y
v(1 − α
y
k) − α
y
x
Px+Tx
Px
(ca − e), (A.20)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tYa accounts for an inﬁnitely small share of g(Ca,Y a).
Writing (A.3) in terms of φ(.,.) (i.e.
dφ
dg/
dφ
dE =
PcCa+PyYa
gPe ) and log-linearizing, we arrive
at
ca − e = σete, (A.21)
where σe represents the substitution elasticity between emissions and aggregate end-of-
pipe treatment in φ(.,.). Employing (A.21) to eliminate (ca − e) from (A.20), we ﬁnd
emissions in terms of the emission tax and the demand for the intermediate input33
e = x − ¯ σeˆ te, (A.22)
where ¯ σe ≡
α
y
v(1−α
y
k)−α
y
x
Px+Tx
Px −α
y
e
(α
y
v(1−α
y
k)−α
y
x
Px+Tx
Px )α
y
e
σe.
A.1.6 Solution of the model
We can solve the model for py,p x,r x,r y,x,e,and y most easily by writing the equilibrium
in the market for the ﬁnal good (from (A.10) and A.13)) and in the market for the
intermediate good (from (A.19) and (A.18)) as follows:
(εy
y +¯ σg)ˆ py = εy
xˆ px + εy
x[ˆ tx + ˆ te] − ˆ σ
y
kˆ sky − εy
ys,
(ˆ σx + εx
x)ˆ px = εx
yˆ py − εx
x[ˆ tx + ˆ te]+ˆ σ
y
kˆ sky − ˆ σx
kˆ skx + εx
ys.
These are two linear equations in two unknowns (i.e. ˆ py ad ˆ px) and can be solved
by Cramer’s rule
µ
ˆ py
ˆ px
¶
=
1
Σ
µ
ˆ σx + εx
x ε
y
x
εx
y ε
y
y +¯ σg
¶
× (A.23)
µ
ε
y
x[ˆ tx + ˆ te] − ˆ σ
y
kˆ sky − ε
y
ys
−εx
x[ˆ tx + ˆ te]+ˆ σ
y
kˆ sky − ˆ σx
kˆ skx + εx
ys
¶
.
where Σ ≡ (¯ σg + ε
y
y)(ˆ σx + εx
x) − ε
y
xεx
y > 0 [since ε
y
yεx
x − ε
y
xεx
y > 0].
The changes in the key model variables are easily derived from the solutions for ˆ py
33Without an initial emission tax (i.e. α
y
e =0 ) ,t h eﬁrm does not abate in the initial equilibrium (i.e.
Ca = Ya =0 )so that α
y
v(1−α
y
k)−α
y
x −α
y
e =0 . The elasticity ¯ σe remains ﬁnite in such an equilibrium.
The same holds true for α
y
ete =
EdTe
(Py+S)Y even though te goes to inﬁnity if the initial emission tax is
zero.
32and ˆ px (which represent the changes in equilibrium goods prices):
ˆ rx =ˆ px +ˆ skx, (A.24)
ˆ ry =ˆ py − ˆ px − ˆ tx − ˆ te +ˆ sky + s, (A.25)
x =ˆ σxˆ px +ˆ σx
kˆ skx, (A.26)
e = x − ¯ σeˆ te (A.27)
y = −¯ σgˆ py. (A.28)
kx =ˆ σx
kˆ rx, (A.29)
ky =ˆ σ
y
kˆ ry. (A.30)
A.2 Overall eﬃciency impacts
We now analyze the non-environmental eﬃciency impacts of the policies. The welfare
impact is deﬁned as the sum of the changes in the after-tax producer surplus in the
upstream industry (PSX), the change in the after-tax producer surplus in the down-
stream industry (PSY), and the change in non-environmental (after-tax) consumer sur-
plus (NCS). It will be convenient to express the welfare impacts relative to (Py +S)Y ,
the initial before-tax value of the output of the downstream industry Y .I n w h a t f o l -
lows, we include the relevant terms for all policies simultaneously. To calculate the eﬀect
for an emissions tax alone, for example in equation (11a) of the main text, the fuel tax
and subsidy to output would drop out of the expressions. The three components can
be written as
psx ≡
dPSX
(Py + S)Y
=( 1− T)(ˆ rx + πx)=( 1− T)(ˆ px +ˆ skx + πx), (A.31)
psy ≡
dPSY
PyY
=( 1− T)(ˆ ry + πy)=( 1− T)(ˆ py − ˆ px − ˆ tx − ˆ te +ˆ sky + s + πy), (A.32)
ncs ≡
dNCS
PyY
= −(1 − T)[
Py
Py + S
py +( t/β)], (A.33)
where we assume that all factor income is taxed at the factor tax rate T. We deﬁne
πx ≡ dΠx
(Py+S)Y , πy ≡
dΠy
(Py+S)Y , and t ≡ dT/(1−T),w h e r eΠi (i = x,y) denotes lump-sum
compensation to sector i. β ≡ PyY/Q, where Q is aggregate factor income (before tax).
This share goes to zero in our model, in which the downstream and upstream sectors
are very small compared to the rest of the economy.34
The overall welfare eﬀect, expressed as a cost, is then ψ ≡− (psx + psy + ncs):
ψ = −(1 − T)[−(t/β) − ∆ + π], (A.34)
34A l s ot h er e l a t i v ec h a n g ei nt h ef a c t o rt a x ,t, goes to zero. However, the ratio t/β in (A.33) is well
deﬁned.
33where ∆ ≡ ˆ tx + ˆ te − ˆ sky − ˆ skx − s and π ≡ πx + πy.
To ﬁnd a reduced form for ψ, we derive t/β from the government budget constraint.
The log-linearized version of the government budget constraint is given by
(1 − T)∆ + Ω + T(q/β)+( 1− T)(t/β) − (1 − T)π =0 , (A.35)
where q ≡ [ˆ αkk +( 1− ˆ αk)l] is the change in aggregate factor supply (ˆ αk is the share
of capital income in aggregate value added and k and l represent aggregate capital and
labor supply, respectively), and
Ω ≡ αy
ee +
Tx
Px
αy
xx −
S
Py + S
y −
Sky
Ry − Sky
αy
vα
y
kky −
Skx
Rx − Skx
αy
xαx
kkx (A.36)
The factor (1 − T) in (A.35) follows from the non-proﬁt constraint, which implies
that a higher pollution tax implies lower factor income. Ω can be computed from the
solutions for the sector-speciﬁc variables in the polluting sector. Substituting (A.35)
into (A.34) and using
q = εu (−β∆ − t), (A.37)
where εu stands for the uncompensated elasticity of factor supply with respect to factor
rewards, we establish
q/β =
µ
εu
1 − εu[T/(1 − T)]
¶
[Ω/(1 − T) − π]. (A.38)
Substitution of (A.38) into (A.35) yields
ψ = −λΩ + μπ(1 − T), (A.39)
where λ ≡
³
1
1−εu(T/(1−T))
´
stands for the marginal cost of public funds, which repre-
sents the cost in terms of household income of raising one additional dollar of government
revenue spent on public goods that are separable in utility from private goods. The re-
duced expressions for Ω for each of the individual policies explored are given in equations
(11a)-(11d) of the text.
A.3 Decomposition of welfare eﬀects
The welfare costs captured above are for the economy as a whole, but for the purposes
of compensation it is important to express the incidence on each industry individually.
In the notation, we are interested in ˆ rx and ˆ ry, the (normalized) changes in the rental
price of dirty industry capital. This determines the size of the transfer needed for
compensation. The results in this section are expressed in terms of ”forward” and
”backward” shifting. These are deﬁned, respectively, as the amount of the total burden
on the downstream industry Y that can be shifted forward to consumers or backward
to the upstream industry. The initial burden of the policy, less the total amount that
can be shifted forward or backward, is the burden that remains on the Y industry. The
incidence on the X industry is simply deﬁned as the amount of the total burden that is
34shifted backward onto it. We examine each of the four environmental policies in turn.
A.3.1 Emissions tax
We ﬁrst consider the impact of ˆ te > 0, omitting all other policy instruments. This
incidence on the X and Y industries, given in (A.42) and (A.45), is shown to be ﬁrst
order and proportional to the amount of abatement.
Burden on the X industry (shifted backward from Y )
The downstream Y industry shifts part of the cost burden ˆ te backward in lower input
prices. This represents the burden on the X industry. The ﬁrst equality below follows
from (A.24) and the second follows from (A.23):
ˆ rx =ˆ px = −
µ
¯ εx
x
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶
ˆ te = −
µ
εx
x(¯ σg + ε
y
y) − ε
y
xεx
y
(ˆ σx +¯ εx
x)(¯ σg + ε
y
y)
¶
ˆ te, (A.40)
with ¯ εx
x ≡ εx
x −
ε
y
xεx
y
(¯ σg+ε
y
y). The share of the overall burden that can be shifted backward
depends on the composite demand elasticity for the intermediate input ¯ εx
x compared to
the supply elasticity ˆ σx. Backward shifting is important if supply of the intermediate
good is inelastic compared to demand.
This expression for ˆ rx can be simpliﬁed further by solving for the emissions tax,
ˆ te, required to achieve a certain abatement target a = −e by substituting (A.40) into
(A.26) and substituting the result into (A.27):
ˆ te = κea, (A.41)
where
κe ≡
∙
¯ εx
x
µ
ˆ σx
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶
+¯ σe
¸−1
,
¯ εx
x ≡
³
[ˆ σ
y
k + ˆ σv
1−α
y
k
][¯ σg + α
y
k(1 − α
y
v)ˆ σy]+
ˆ σ
y
kˆ σvα
y
kα
y
k
(1−α
y
k)
´
¡
ˆ σ
y
k +ˆ σv(1 − α
y
k)+( 1− α
y
v)α
y
kˆ σy +¯ σg
¢
Finally, substitution of (A.41) into (A.40) yields:
ˆ rx = −
µ
¯ εx
x
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶
κea = −
∙
ˆ σx +¯ σe
µ
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¯ εx
x
¶¸−1
a, (A.42)
With lump-sum compensation, we need to set πx = −ˆ rx (see (A.31)) to compensate
the capital owners in the upstream industry for their decline in rents.
Fraction of burden on Y shifted forward
The downstream industry can also shift part of the cost burden ˆ te f o r w a r di nh i g h e r
output prices (from (A.23))
ˆ py =
µ
ˆ σx
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶µ
ε
y
x
¯ σg + ε
y
y
¶
ˆ te. (A.43)
35In terms of the abatement target, the eﬀect on output prices is given by:
ˆ py =
µ
ε
y
x
¯ σg + ε
y
y
¶∙
¯ εx
x +¯ σe
µ
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
ˆ σx
¶¸−1
a (A.44)
Comparing (A.40) and (A.44), we notice that for forward shifting the demand elas-
ticity ¯ εx
x rather than the supply elasticity ˆ σx is relevant.
Overall incidence on Y
The overall eﬀect on the owners of the downstream industry is as follows (the ﬁrst
equality follows from (A.25), while the second equality follows from substituting (A.40)
and (A.43)):
ˆ ry =ˆ py − ˆ px − ˆ te = −
µ
ˆ σx
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶µ
¯ σg + ε
y
y − ε
y
x
¯ σg + ε
y
y
¶
ˆ te = (A.45)
−
µ
¯ σg + α
y
k(1 − α
y
v)ˆ σy − α
y
kˆ σv
¯ σg +ˆ σ
y
k +( 1− α
y
k)ˆ σv +( 1− α
y
v)α
y
kˆ σy
¶∙
¯ εx
x +¯ σe
µ
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
ˆ σx
¶¸−1
a.
With lump-sum compensation, we need to set πy = −ˆ ry (see (A.32)) to compensate
the capital owners in the upstream industry for their decline in rents.
A.3.2 Fuel tax
A tax on the demand for the intermediate input implies similar redistributional eﬀects
as a tax on emissions. The only diﬀerence is that such a fuel tax does not employ the
end-of-pipe channel to reduce emissions. Hence, the cost increase that is required to
achieve a given abatement target is larger. In particular, we have
ˆ tx ≡ αy
xtx = κxa, (A.46)
with
κx ≡
∙
¯ εx
x
µ
ˆ σx
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶¸−1
=
(¯ σg + ε
y
y)(ˆ σx +¯ εx
x)
ˆ σx[(¯ σg + ε
y
y)εx
x − εx
yε
y
x]
.
We ﬁnd the following distributional eﬀects:
ˆ rx =ˆ px = −
µ
¯ εx
x
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶
ˆ tx = −
a
ˆ σx. (A.47)
ˆ py =
µ
ˆ σx
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶µ
ε
y
x
¯ σg + ε
y
y
¶
ˆ tx =
µ
ε
y
x
¯ σg + ε
y
y
¶
a
¯ εx
x
.
ˆ ry =ˆ py − ˆ px − ˆ tx = −
µ
ˆ σx
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶µ
¯ σg + ε
y
y − ε
y
x
¯ σg + ε
y
y
¶
ˆ tx =
−
µ
¯ σg + α
y
k(1 − α
y
v)ˆ σy − α
y
kˆ σv
¯ σg +ˆ σ
y
k +( 1− α
y
k)ˆ σv +( 1− α
y
v)α
y
kˆ σy
¶
a
¯ εx
x
.
36As with the emissions tax, the expressions derived for ˆ rx and ˆ ry are not functions of α
y
e
or Tx, but rather are proportional to the amount of abatement, a. Hence, even at low
levels of abatement, the dirty industries require compensation.
A.3.3 Technology mandate
The incidence of policy on the dirty industries under a technology mandate is in sharp
contrast to the two tax policies considered above. The key analytical result is that
incidence no longer depends in a ﬁrst-order way on abatement, but rather goes to zero
as initial abatement gets small. The costs of lump-sum compensation then also vanish,
which can make this policy more attractive than the taxes from an overall eﬃciency
point of view.
A technology mandate implies a higher implicit emissions tax (i.e. te > 0) and a
higher implicit subsidy on the intermediate input (i.e. tx < 0) such that the additional
implicit tax revenue from this combination of instruments is exactly zero:
ˆ te + ˆ tx + αy
ee + ¯ Txαy
xx =0 , (A.48)
where ¯ Tx ≡ Tx/Px.
Substitution of (A.40) and (A.47) into (A.26) yields
x =˜ σx(ˆ te + ˆ tx),
where ˜ σx ≡
ˆ σx¯ εx
x
ˆ σx+¯ εx
x. Substituting this expression into (A.48) to eliminate x, we ﬁnd the
required overall cost increase ˆ te + ˆ tx in terms of the abatement target a = −e :
ˆ te + ˆ tx =
α
y
ea
1 − ¯ T
y
xα
y
x˜ σx,
(A.49)
and the impact on the demand for the intermediate input
x = −˜ σx(ˆ te + ˆ tx)=
˜ σxα
y
ea
1 − ¯ Txα
y
x˜ σx.
Substitution of the latter expression in a = −x +¯ σeˆ te to eliminate x yields the
required increase in the price of emissions:
ˆ te =
µ
1 −
˜ σxα
y
e
1 − ¯ Txα
y
x˜ σx
¶
a
¯ σe
. (A.50)
The distributional eﬀects are then given by (where we use (A.23))
ˆ rx =ˆ px = −
µ
¯ εx
x
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶
(ˆ te + ˆ tx)=−
µ
¯ εx
x
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶µ
α
y
ea
1 − ¯ Txα
y
x˜ σx
¶
. (A.51)
ˆ py =
µ
ˆ σx
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶µ
ε
y
x
¯ σg + ε
y
y
¶
(ˆ te + ˆ tx)=
µ
ˆ σx
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶µ
ε
y
x
¯ σg + ε
y
y
¶µ
α
y
ea
1 − ¯ Txα
y
x˜ σx
¶
.
37ˆ ry =ˆ py − ˆ px − ˆ te − ˆ tx = −
µ
ˆ σx
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶µ
¯ σg + ε
y
y − ε
y
x
¯ σg + ε
y
y
¶
(ˆ te + ˆ tx)
= −
µ
ˆ σx
ˆ σx +¯ εx
x
¶µ
¯ σg + α
y
k(1 − α
y
v)ˆ σy − α
y
kˆ σv
¯ σg +ˆ σ
y
k +( 1− α
y
k)ˆ σv +( 1− α
y
v)α
y
kˆ σy
¶µ
α
y
ea
1 − ¯ Txα
y
x˜ σx
¶
.
We ﬁrst interpret the expressions above in case we start from a situation without any
environmental policy (i.e. α
y
e =0 ) . In that case, environmental policy does not yield
any ﬁrst-order costs. Moreover, redistributional eﬀects are completely absent. This
environmental policy yields neither eﬃciency costs nor redistributional eﬀects. Again,
this is in contrast to the emissions tax and the fuel tax.
With a technology mandate, the increase in the price of emissions required to achieve
a given emission target a is, however, larger than with a pure emission tax (compare
(A.50) and (A.41)). The reason is that the technology mandate uses only the end-of-pipe
channel, whereas the emissions tax also employs input and output substitution.
We now turn to the case in which environmental policy is already present (i.e. α
y
e > 0
and ¯ Tx < 0). Hence, a further tightening of environmental policy yields ﬁrst-order
eﬃciency costs. With a technology mandate, these eﬃciency costs are a direct burden
to the downstream industry in terms of higher costs (see (A.49)). This is in contrast
to the emissions tax and the fuel tax. With these instruments, the eﬃciency costs are
borne by the general public, as these costs erode the tax base (and thus require higher
factor tax rates).
A.3.4 Performance standard
The performance standard represents a more complex case. Its eﬀects in between the
emissions tax and the technology mandate. It implies a higher implicit emission tax
(i.e. te > 0) and a higher implicit subsidy on the ﬁnal output (i.e. s>0) such that the
additional implicit tax revenue from this combination of instruments is exactly zero:
ˆ te − s + αy
ee − ¯ Sy =0 , (A.52)
where ¯ S ≡ S
Py+S.We ﬁrst consider the case in which initial environmental policy is absent
(i.e. α
y
e = S =0 )so that there are no ﬁrst-order eﬃciency eﬀects. In this case, we have
ˆ te = s.
Incidence on X (shifted backward from Y )
The result for backward shifting is given by (use (A.23) with ˆ te = s)
ˆ rx =ˆ px = −
µ
¯ σg(εx
x − εx
y)+εx
xε
y
y − ε
y
xεx
y
(¯ σg + ε
y
y)(ˆ σx + εx
x) − ε
y
xεx
y
¶
ˆ te = (A.53)
−
⎛
⎝
¯ σgˆ σv
α
y
k
1−α
y
k
+[ˆ σ
y
k + ˆ σv
1−α
y
k
][α
y
k(1 − α
y
v)ˆ σy]+
ˆ σ
y
kˆ σvα
y
kα
y
k
(1−α
y
k)
(¯ σg + ε
y
y)(ˆ σx + εx
x) − ε
y
xεx
y
⎞
⎠ˆ te
= −Φpˆ te,
38This shifting share Φp ≡
[ˆ σ
y
k+ ˆ σv
1−αy
k
][α
y
k(1−α
y
v)ˆ σy]+
ˆ σy
kˆ σvαy
kαy
k
(1−αy
k) +¯ σgˆ σv
αy
k
1−αy
k
(¯ σg+ε
y
y)(ˆ σx+εx
x)−ε
y
xεx
y lies between zero
and unity. In contrast to the technology mandate, the performance standard hurts the
upstream industry even if we introduce the policy from an initial situation without any
environmental policy. Intuitively, the performance standard employs input substitution
to cut pollution. This reduces the demand for intermediate input and thereby harms the
upstream industry. Indeed, the abatement eﬀect is given by (the third equality follows
from (A.53))
a = −x +¯ σeˆ te = −ˆ σxˆ px +¯ σeˆ te =[ ˆ σxΦp +¯ σe]ˆ te, (A.54)
so that we have
ˆ te = κpa, (A.55)
where
κp ≡ [ˆ σxΦp +¯ σe]−1. (A.56)
The increase in the shadow price for emissio n si st h u sl a r g e rt h a nw i t ha ne m i s s i o n
tax, but lower than with a technology mandate. The reason is that a performance
standard employs more channels to cut emissions than a technology mandate (namely
input substitution) but fewer channels than an emission tax (namely output cuts).
Note that the burden on the upstream industry is larger than under the technology
mandate, but smaller than under the emission tax (note that we assume α
y
e =0for
now). The impact on the upstream industry can be written as
ˆ rx =ˆ px = −
µ
Φi
ˆ σxΦi +¯ σe
¶
a, i = p,e, (A.57)
where the shifting share in case of the emission tax, Φe ≡− (ˆ rx/ˆ te) is given by
Φe ≡
µ
¯ σgεx
x + εx
xε
y
y − ε
y
xεx
y
(¯ σg + ε
y
y)(ˆ σx + εx
x) − ε
y
xεx
y
¶
≥ Φp =
µ
¯ σg(εx
x − εx
y)+εx
xε
y
y − ε
y
xεx
y
(¯ σg + ε
y
y)(ˆ σx + εx
x) − ε
y
xεx
y
¶
. (A.58)
The inequality implies that the decline in rx is larger under an emissions tax than under
a performance target. Intuitively, the performance standard does not cut emissions
through output substitution and thus relies more on the end-of-pipe channel, which
does not reduce demand for the intermediate input.
Fraction of burden on Y shifted forward
Forward shifting amounts to (use (A.23) with ˆ te = s)
ˆ py = −
µ
ˆ σx(ε
y
y − ε
y
x)+εx
xε
y
y − ε
y
xεx
y
(¯ σg + ε
y
y)(ˆ σx + εx
x) − ε
y
xεx
y
¶
ˆ te = (A.59)
−
⎛
⎝
α
y
kˆ σx[(1 − α
y
v)ˆ σy − ˆ σv]+[ˆ σ
y
k + ˆ σv
1−α
y
k
][α
y
k(1 − α
y
v)ˆ σy]+
ˆ σ
y
kˆ σvα
y
kα
y
k
(1−α
y
k)
(¯ σg + ε
y
y)(ˆ σx + εx
x) − ε
y
xεx
y
⎞
⎠ˆ te.
Consumers will beneﬁt from the performance target (the change in price ˆ py is gen-
39erally negative) unless ˆ σy is very small compared to ˆ σv, while at the same time ˆ σx is
large. Assuming that the intermediate input is complementary to capital (i.e. ˆ σy À ˆ σv)
excludes this case. The eﬀect on quantity of output is given by
y = −
ˆ py
¯ σg
, (A.60)
meaning that, since the change in price is generally negative, the output channel for
abatement is not used.
Overall burden on Y
The eﬀect on the rental price of capital in the downstream industry is the sum of
backward and forward shifting. There is no net burden in this case since ˆ te − s =0 :
ˆ ry =ˆ py − ˆ px =
µ
¯ σg(εx
x − εx
y) − ˆ σx(ε
y
y − ε
y
x)
(¯ σg + ε
y
y)(ˆ σx + εx
x) − ε
y
xεx
y
¶
ˆ te = (A.61)
⎛
⎝
¯ σgˆ σv
α
y
k
1−α
y
k
+ α
y
kˆ σx[ˆ σv − (1 − α
y
v)ˆ σy]
(¯ σg + ε
y
y)(ˆ σx + εx
x) − ε
y
xεx
y
⎞
⎠ˆ te.
A performance target thus beneﬁts the downstream industry if ˆ σv and ¯ σg are large
compared to ˆ σy and ˆ σx. Intuitively, the implicit subsidy is shifted to the downstream
industry (i.e. supply), while the implicit tax on intermediate input is shifted to the
upstream industry. Moreover, the downstream industry ﬁnds it easy to shift away from
the dearer input (to capital) while ﬁnding it diﬃcult to shift to the cheaper input labor
(as a consequence of the output subsidy).
Overall eﬃciency and compensation needs under the performance standard
At initial abatement, and like the other policies, the performance target does not
impose any net burden when summing the eﬀect across polluting sectors and consumers
of the polluting ﬁnal commodity. Speciﬁcally, we have (using (A.24) and (A.25))
ˆ py − ˆ rx − ˆ ry = ˆ te − s =0 . (A.62)
In contrast to the technology mandate, however, the performance standard does
redistribute across the three parties involved in pollution: the owners of the downstream
sector, the owners of the upstream sector and the consumers of the polluting industry.
In particular, consumers of the polluting ﬁnal good gain at the expense of the owners
of the upstream industry. The need for compensation can be written as
π = −ˆ rx − ˆ ry = −ˆ py > 0 (A.63)
Unlike the technology mandate, then, the performance standard requires compensation
even at initial abatement, and so can involve a ﬁrst-order cost of raising revenue for
lump-sum compensation.
40The performance standard is an intermediate case to the emissions tax and technol-
ogy mandate, both in terms of overall eﬃciency costs and required compensation. It
uses more abatement channels than the technology mandate, but fewer than the emis-
sions tax, making the ﬁrst-order abatement costs intermediate. In terms of the need
for compensation, the performance standard involves some rent shifting at incremental
abatement, which gives rise to some compensation need. The total amount of com-
pensation needed is less, though, than under the emissions tax since the downstream
industry suﬀers less.
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Policies and Their Implementation in the Numerical Model 
 
 
 
 
Policy    Instrument for Achieving ... 
 
 
 
 
 
Emissions Target 
 
EVN Constraint 
 
Government Budget 
Balance 
 
 
Emissions Tax 
 
 
 
 
 
tax on E 
 
 
 
 
 
Input (Fuel) Tax 
 
 
 
tax on X 
 
Technology Mandate 
(constraint on Ya/X) 
 
 
 
 
revenue-neutral* 
combination of tax on E 
and subsidy to X.   
 
Performance Standard 
(constraint on E/Y) 
 
 
 
revenue-neutral* 
combination of tax on E 
and subsidy to Y  
 
 
 
sector-specific lump-sum 
tax credit 
 
            or 
 
sector-specific reductions 
in capital tax rates 
 
 
(all policies) 
 
 
 
 
 
economy-wide 
equi-proportionate cuts in 
capital and labor tax rates 
 
 
 
 
(all policies) 
 
 
 
* Revenue-neutral at the industry level.  This neutrality is gross of changes in revenues stemming from 
impacts on the bases of other taxes. Table 2 
 
Benchmark Input-Output flows for the Numerical Model
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
Use of Input by Industry ... 
  
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
Y 
 
 
C 
 
  Total 
  Receipts to 
  Each Input 
 
 
Endowments
3
 
Input
2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   X 
 
       0.0 
 
     27.1 
 
       0.0 
 
         27.1   
 
   L 
 
       2.6 
 
     11.8 
 
 1765.3 
 
     1779.7 
 
      5249.8 
 
   K 
 
     13.7 
 
     44.0 
 
   712.4 
 
       770.1 
 
      2271.5 
 
   factor taxes 
 
     10.8 
 
     48.0 
 
 1651.8 
 
     1710.6 
 
 
 
Total Input 
Payments by 
Each Industry 
 
 
     27.1 
 
 
   130.9 
 
 
 4129.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SO2 Emissions
4  
 
 
     15.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 In billions of year-2000 dollars per year except where otherwise noted 
 
2 Inputs of labor and capital are net of factor taxes. 
3 Endowments correspond to L
_
and K
_
in equation (20) of text. 
 
4 Millions of tons per year 
 
 
Sources:  Except for the emissions data, these flows are based on the Department of Commerce 
Bureau of Economic Analysis=s Benchmark Input & Output Tables for 1992.  The emissions data 
are from Table 12.6 of the Energy Information Agency=s Annual Energy Review 1999.  Table  3 
  Central Case Parameter Values 
 
parameters for Y industry 
 
β e  ease of end-of pipe treatment -- scale parameter    2.0 
ρ e  ease of end-of-pipe treatment -- curvature parameter    0.6 
 
σ y  elasticity of substitution between     
v and L in production of Y       0.75 
 
σ v  elasticity of substitution between  
X and K in production of v        0.15   
 
 
parameters for X and C industries 
 
σ x  elasticity of substitution between     
K and L in production of X       1.0 
 
σ c  elasticity of substitution between     
v and L in production of C       1.0 
 
 
other production-related parameters 
 
σ k  ease of capital movement                   -1.0 
 
 
utility function parameters 
 
σ u  elasticity of substitution between 
G (C-Y composite) and H (L-K)  composite    0.66 
 
σ g  elasticity of substitution between 
C and Y       0.9 
 
σ h  elasticity of substitution between 
L and K       0.9 Table 4:  Impacts of Alternative Policies
(No Industry Compensation Requirement)
Policy Experiment Tax on Emissions Tax on Fuel Technology Mandate Performance Standard Grandfathered permits (Y)
Percent abatement 10 25 75 10 25 75 10 25 75 10 25 75
Tax on E or X
1 0.10 0.26 3.87 0.54 1.93 42.52 0.11 0.29 4.99 0.10 0.27 4.44
Fraction abatement from EOP 0.88 0.89 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.98 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.83
Aggregate Cost (as % of income) 0.001 0.008 0.160 0.011 0.077 1.387 0.001 0.008 0.176 0.001 0.008 0.169
Price and Quantity Impacts
% change in supply price of X -0.89 -2.13 -13.58 -7.52 -19.15 -61.92 -0.06 -0.32 -6.39 -0.50 -1.26 -9.70
% change in demand price of X -0.89 -2.13 -13.58 42.15 136.29 1417.83 -5.47 -12.46 -82.90 -0.50 -1.26 -9.70
% change in quantity of X -1.19 -2.85 -17.89 -10.00 -25.00 -75.00 -0.08 -0.44 -8.52 -0.68 -1.71 -12.92
% change in supply price of Y 0.67 1.63 12.99 6.40 20.45 210.79 0.04 0.24 5.32 1.14 2.69 19.35
% change in demand price of Y 1.66 3.95 24.90 14.27 36.45 100.48 0.10 0.55 10.79 -0.06 0.16 7.25
% change in quantity of Y -0.58 -1.42 -10.40 -5.32 -15.21 -64.37 -0.04 -0.22 -4.70 0.01 -0.11 -4.21
Incidence
2
Change in profit to X -0.14 -0.34 -2.20 -1.20 -3.04 -9.70 -0.01 -0.05 -1.07 -0.08 -0.21 -1.59
As a % of EV 172% 71% 22% 183% 64% 11% 10% 10% 10% 93% 41% 15%
Change in profit to Y -0.22 -0.54 -3.99 -2.00 -5.79 -25.81 -0.02 -0.09 -1.85 0.02 -0.02 -1.50
As a % of EV 265% 111% 40% 305% 121% 30% 17% 17% 17% -20% 3% 14%
Change in profit to X and Y -0.36 -0.88 -6.19 -3.20 -8.83 -35.50 -0.02 -0.14 -2.92 -0.06 -0.22 -3.09
As a % of EV 438% 182% 62% 487% 185% 41% 27% 27% 27% 73% 44% 30%
Change in profit to C 0.05 0.03 -1.68 0.42 0.22 -19.39 -0.02 -0.12 -2.55 -0.03 -0.13 -2.57
Change in wage income 0.23 0.36 -2.38 2.03 3.14 -41.06 -0.05 -0.26 -5.53 0.00 -0.15 -4.92
1Tax on emissions is in thousands of dollars per ton; Tax on fuel is in percent.
2Units in this panel are billions of dollars unless indicated otherwise.Table 5:  Effects of Policies with and without EVN Constraint
(Emissions reduced by 25 percent in all cases)
Tax on
Emissions Tax on Fuel Technology 
Mandate
Performance 
Standard
Aggregate Cost Without EVN
1 0.0078 0.0767 0.0084 0.0081
Compensation Needed for EVN
for X as % of profit 2.50 22.26 0.40 1.51
for Y as % of profit 1.22 13.17 0.20 0.04
total as % of profit 1.52 15.33 0.25 0.38
EVN Via Tax Credits
aggregate cost with EVN 0.0112 0.1081 0.0090 0.0090
increase in cost 0.0034 0.0313 0.0006 0.0009
EVN Via Cuts in Factor Tax Rates
aggregate cost with EVN 0.0083 0.1633 0.0086 0.0084
increase in cost 0.0005 0.0866 0.0002 0.0003
tax rates used to achieve EVN
capital tax rate for X
2 34.86 -281.62 39.29 35.94
capital tax rate for Y 38.78 -26.58 39.82 40.65
1Aggregate costs are expressed as percent of benchmark income.
2All capital taxes are set to 40% in the benchmark.Table 6:  Policy Costs under Alternative Parameter Values
Equivalent 
Variation (EV) at 
25% Abatement
Emissions Tax
No EVN No EVN With EVN No EVN With EVN No EVN With EVN No EVN With EVN
Central case 0.0078 1.000 1.439 9.885 13.924 1.084 1.156 1.043 1.154
βe (end-of-pipe treatment ease)
Very low (0.0) 0.0767 1.000 1.409 1.000 1.409 n/a n/a 2.260 2.424
Low (1.0) 0.0202 1.000 1.425 3.791 5.341 1.243 1.325 1.118 1.231
High (4.0) 0.0026 1.000 1.447 29.139 41.047 1.028 1.096 1.014 1.125
σk (capital adjustment costs)
Very low (-100.0) 0.0074 1.000 1.037 7.298 7.551 1.119 1.130 1.066 1.082
Low (-4.0) 0.0075 1.000 1.188 8.060 9.485 1.106 1.141 1.058 1.111
High (-0.25) 0.0080 1.000 1.705 13.462 22.120 1.059 1.168 1.026 1.187
σg (elasticity of demand for Y)
Low (0.45) 0.0079 1.000 1.303 12.959 16.388 1.070 1.121 1.027 1.126
High (1.8) 0.0076 1.000 1.598 7.864 12.384 1.101 1.198 1.062 1.186
σu (factor supply elasticity)
Low (0.33) 0.0069 1.000 1.219 9.889 11.907 1.085 1.120 1.043 1.098
High (1.32) 0.0102 1.000 1.889 9.864 17.996 1.084 1.232 1.042 1.270
σv (substitutability between 
     capital and fuel inputs)
Low (0.075) 0.0079 1.000 1.448 12.023 16.897 1.067 1.139 1.044 1.164
High (0.30) 0.0075 1.000 1.423 7.357 10.291 1.114 1.186 1.041 1.136
Industries compensated
Y industry only 0.0078 1.000 1.267 9.885 12.561 1.084 1.128 1.043 1.051
* In the EVN cases, compensation is provided through corporate tax credits
Ratio of EV at 25% Abatement to EV in Left-Most Column
Emissions Tax Fuel Tax Technology Mandate Performance StandardTechnology 
Mandate
Performance 
Standard
Central case 67 79
βe (end-of-pipe treatment ease)
Very low (0.0) n/a 7
Low (1.0) 35 54
High (4.0) 86 91
σk (capital adjustment costs)
Very low (-100.0) 3 6
Low (-4.0) 35 49
High (-0.25) 76 90
σg (elasticity of demand for Y)
Low (0.45) 61 79
High (1.8) 70 79
σu (factor supply elasticity)
Low (0.33) 47 63
High (1.32) 80 90
σv (substitutability between 
     capital and fuel inputs)
Low (0.075) 72 77
High (0.30) 57 83
Industries compensated
Y industry only 54 75
1The value indicated is the percent abatement at which the emissions
tax becomes more efficient than the policy shown when firms are
compensated via a lump-sum tax credit.
Crossover Point
1
Table 7:  Efficiency "Crossover Points" under Alternative 
Parameter ValuesFigure 1:  Policy Costs relative to Emissions Tax Cost 
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